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The Western press has touted the "traditional alliance" between Russia and Serbia as 
reason to fear that NATO's strikes against Yugoslavia might cast a shadow on post-Cold 
War cooperation. That fear has had immediate effect, driving Western bankers to ignore 
Russia's dismal economic state and press for extension of a new International Monetary  
Fund loan. "If Russia were not an unstable, global power, the international financial 
organizations would have a very different view," Charles Blitzer, chief international 
economist at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, and a former World Bank official, told The 
Financial Times. "This is political. Yugoslavia has made it all the more important not to 
push Russia out of the tent." (1)
Russians have no need for historic grievances with the West, however, since there are 
plenty of contemporary reasons to be angry. The cultural justifications for their 
frustration have only allowed Moscow to portray the Clinton administration as naïve 
adventurers, best restrained by stronger European institutions. If the Russian 
government has fulfilled any historical destiny, it has been to use trouble in the Balkans 
as a means to strengthen its hand in European affairs.
Rarely in history has the Russian state been so driven by intellectual dreams of pan-
Slavism that it has lost sight of its own interests. Russian expansion in the 18th and 
19th centuries led the Kremlin to support Balkan populations, but also to manipulate 
them towards its own ends. Peter the Great did indeed call on the region's Christians to 
rise up against their Ottoman rulers as his armies marched towards the Pruth River, but 
the "liberation" of Christians was always a means for destabilizing the Ottomans rather 
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than an end in itself. Catherine the Great won the right to represent Balkan Christians 
vis-à-vis the Ottomans in 1774, but her program merely fit into a larger plan to destroy 
the Turkish empire and seize its territory. The first Serbian nationalist uprising, in 1804, 
was rebuffed by Moscow for two years until Russia's war with the Ottomans made the 
Serbs a useful irritant; the Serbs were promptly abandoned a year later when Russia 
sought peace. When the Serbs won autonomy for their province in 1830, Russian 
diplomats meddled in its internal affairs. At the height of the Crimean War, Russia 
looked with disfavor on the Serbian government of the Karadjordjevic prince Alexander. 
In the 1885 Balkan War (immortalized in G. B. Shaw's Arms and the Man), Russia 
actually supported Bulgaria against Serbia's Obrenovich king, Milan IV.
Although the tsar supported the Serbs at the beginning of World War One, the 
independent Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was only founded after the 
Bolsheviks, hostile to Yugoslavia's royal government (intermarried with the Romanovs), 
had seized control of the Russian state. During World War Two, Stalin supported the 
Partizan movement fighting Nazi occupation. Three years after the war's end, however, 
Stalin broke decisively with Marshal Tito.
Today, of course, Russia has the luxury of sitting on the sidelines while its primary 
competitor for diplomatic influence, the Western alliance, itself traipses deeper into the 
Balkans. The troika atop the Russian state -- Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Duma 
Speaker Gennadi Seleznev and Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov -- instead sits back 
and carefully exploits NATO's mistakes. If the West would like to believe that the 
Russians are animated by primeval instincts to defend Slavic brethren, then so be it. 
The more their mischief is interpreted as mandated by history, the less responsibility 
they must take for what they do.
The Russian public is, no doubt, genuinely enraged by NATO's attacks. According to a 
poll conducted by the All-Russia Center for Studying Public Opinion, the percentage of 
Russians holding a favorable view of the United States has fallen from 67 percent in 
December 1998 to 33 percent today, while the percentage harboring negative feelings 
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for the US has risen from 23 to 53 percent in the same period. (2) Reportage from 
Moscow indicates, however, that mounting frustration with Russia's helplessness in the 
face of the West, rather than strong fellow feeling for the Serbs, is behind the anger. The 
nations united in bombardment of the Serbs are, after all, the same countries who have 
tied their hopes for Russia to radical economic reform undertaken by an incompetent 
and corrupt government. Aleksander Lebed', governor of the Krasnoyarsk region and 
perennial presidential candidate, attributed the anger in Moscow to the sense that "we 
are a humiliated and offended nation." (3)
A Russian government genuinely driven by pan-Slavism would have responded to such 
an outcry by embracing Yugoslav and Belarusian demands for a Slavic "Political Union" 
enveloping all three states. Instead, all major players in the Russian state have 
downplayed the proposal. Primakov and Seleznev have both cited "numerous legal 
nuances" that must first be taken into account. (4) When could such a union be 
founded? It will "require thorough analysis," Ivanov told the press. "The Foreign Ministry 
is working on it." (5)
In the meantime, however, the Russian government has been actively pursuing the far 
more important, and more self-interested, project of increasing Moscow's influence in 
Europe at the expense of the United States. Six days after the bombing began, 
Primakov was in Belgrade promoting a settlement; shortly thereafter he landed in a 
Western capital -- not Washington, however, but Bonn. Although Primakov's first attempt 
to mediate a peace via Europe was rebuffed, the prime minister nonetheless returned to 
Moscow to assure the Russian public that German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder 
"specifically pointed out that Russia must continue its positive mediating role in the 
future." (6)
The alternative, Ivanov had earlier suggested, was a world in which the United States 
ignores the restraints of the Russia-NATO Founding Act and "seeks to impose a 
unipolar order under which the destinies of peoples would be decided in 
Washington." (7) After a meeting with Knut Vollebaek, chairman of the Organization for 
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Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Ivanov stressed the need for a European 
security system "which could prevent the occurrence of such conflicts in the future."(8) 
Such overtures led the French daily Le Monde to speculate on Primakov's Soviet-style 
motives. The Russian premier, the paper noted, "is convinced that the Europeans, 
divided concerning continuation of the operation, will seize on the first gesture made by 
Milosevic, and he sees this crisis as an opportunity to reposition Russia at the center of 
the international stage."(9)
To diminish US influence and promote pan-European security structures, the Russian 
government has played on continental fears of Islamic fundamentalism. The naïve 
Americans, it is suggested, do not understand that with the end of the Cold War the 
threat has shifted from Moscow to points south. Ivanov and company have, 
unfortunately, had help in this regard from Washington. Having forced moderate 
Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova to side with the radical Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
at the Rambouillet talks, the US State Department is easily portrayed as a friend of 
extremists. Ivanov has since said that the US and NATO directly supported the creation 
of the KLA in order to separate Kosovo from Yugoslavia. "In this way," Ivanov said, "a 
center of Islamic extremism is being created in the heart of Europe with the help of 
Europeans themselves and this center will no doubt spread like a cancer across the 
continent."(10) The self-consciously more sophisticated Russians, on the other hand, 
have supported Belgrade's every use of Rugova as a negotiating partner. (Whether 
Rugova has been negotiating of his own free will has become irrelevant, since he is as 
interested as any Serb in the reduction of the KLA's influence).
The Russians have therefore picked apart an alliance the US cobbled together, and 
come off as the more erudite negotiators for their trouble. It is perhaps most ironic that 
the world power most easily convinced of Russian diplomatic skill is the country -- the 
United States -- against which its government's efforts have been most urgently 
deployed. The New York Times reported on April 20 that President Bill Clinton had 
called Russian President Boris Yel'tsin to seek Russian diplomatic help resolving the 
Kosovo crisis.(11) The US, in other words, had gone in one month from hoping IMF aid 
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would buy Russian silence on the crisis to hoping instead for Russian help in finding a 
way out of it. The Times attributed the American overture to the realization that "any 
solution requires Russian cooperation, because of the nation's special relationship with 
the Serbs."
If such an accolade is a tribute to Russia's dexterity with its own past, it does not 
address what is perhaps Prime Minister Primakov's greatest political accomplishment -- 
securing his own position as the inevitable heir to the presidential throne. All State 
Duma factions, from the liberal Yabloko and Right Cause parties to the extreme 
Communists and nationalists, have thrown their support behind his diplomatic initiatives. 
Outspoken opponents of Primakov such as Boris Nemtsov today call for the refusal of 
US aid and boycott of Western products.(12) "Our active work to oppose NATO's 
aggression against Yugoslavia," Ivanov noted, "is consolidating rather than separating 
us in internal policy."(13) A few brave Russian journalists have wryly noted that the 
sleazier elements around Primakov's administration have been given a new rallying cry, 
as if pan-Slavism were "the last refuge of the scoundrel." "The government," Aleksandr 
Budberg notes, "has gained an opportunity to switch the population from the blunders in 
the economy, from the unpaid wages and pensions, and from the rising dollar exchange 
rate and towards an outside enemy."(14) Yel'tsin has been given a reprieve from 
controversies, such as the appointment of Aleksander Voloshin as his chief of staff, 
which had threatened to widen the gulf between him and the Duma. Such newfound 
unity is not only in Yel'tsin's interest, of course, since Primakov's hopes of replacing 
Yel'tsin in elections next summer depend on prolonging the cease-fire between the 
Kremlin and parliament. Brave will be the politician who challenges the architect of 
peace in Europe and unity at home.
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